Scientific progress, in general, involves a significant level of ethical responsibility — including in animal sciences.

Recently scientists have increasingly been held responsible for a range of environmental issues linked to emerging technologies. Animal scientists, in particular, often find themselves subject to criticism that far exceeds their actual responsibility. This growing disapproval raises an important question: are present criticisms rooted in a historical lack of ethical responsibility among scientists? And if so, to what extent are today’s consequences the result of past scientific decisions made without adequate foresight or ethical consideration?

For much of human history, the ethical implications of scientific actions were limited in scope, because the technologies available had equally limited spatial and temporal impact. Consequently, the divergence between individual (micro) ethics and broader societal (macro) ethics posed little threat. The effects of scientific advancements were generally contained, and the moral scope guiding them was proportional to the scale of their outcomes.

However, the last decades have seen a profound change. The potential reach of scientific and technological interventions has expanded dramatically, often producing long-term effects across vast geographical and generational boundaries. But humanity’s moral development has not kept pace with this expansion. As a result, scientists now exercise tools with immense transformative power yet often lack the ethical framework or predictive capacity to fully grasp their broader consequences.

The outcomes of scientific activities can now go over the limits of human imagination and moral preparedness, challenging our ability to exert responsible control over them. At the same time, the collective sense of moral responsibility has not evolved to address these new realities. And the forces that have enhanced humanity’s technological power—namely the spirit of unbounded scientific innovation—have also undermined the philosophical foundations upon which ethical norms could be built. The main attitude within science and technology tends to reject external constraints, with the capacity to act often seen as justification enough for action, irrespective of long-term effects.

In this context, a new ethical framework is urgently needed—one capable of accounting for the power and impact of modern science, such as the “Heuristics of Fear” proposed by the German philosopher, Hans Jonas.

The challenge is even greater in animal production, for scientific advancement is closely tied not only to economic pressures but also the imperative to feed a growing population. Yet, it is precisely these forces that often impede the development and application of such an ethics, dismissing any attempt to question the progression of science and technology. Without addressing this ethical gap, humanity feels to allow its own advancements to outpace its capacity for responsible management and, inevitably, this opens the door to criticism—often directed at the scientists themselves including those of us working in animal science.

Source: Newsletter EAAP n. 273